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(approximatedly 1000 firms) of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1990-1993. There are 
important implications arising from the empirical results: i) Product and process innovations are intimately 
related independently of the model used in the estimation. ii) The control by unobserved firm effects as the 
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other factors determining them, it is also very important to consider a version of the model that allows 
correlation among those unobserved effects and explanatory variables. iv) The probability to innovate is 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the determinants of innovation activity in a large sample of 
Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1990-1993. A distinction is made between 
product and process innovations and, among the explanatory variables, special attention is paid 
to firm and market characteristics. The analysis incorporates some important differences 
regarding to previous works in this field. On the one hand, we distinguish different kinds of 
innovations. On the other, the use of panel data allows us to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, that is we focuss on the role of unobservd managerial effects and its effects on 
the decision to innovate. 
The reasons for the presence and intensity of innovation activities in firms and 
industries have received a lot of attention in the economic literature during the past 50 years. 
Most of this research tries to expand the line opened by Schumpeter (1942). As it is well 
known, the Schumpeterian hypotheses look at firm's characteristics (mainly its size as a source 
of internally generated financial resources) and at the characteristics of the market (mainly the 
degree of competition) as the principal determinants of innovation activity by business firms. 
Therefore, most of the post Schumpeterian empirical research has focused in trying to test 
whether larger firms in markets with "not too much" competition innovate more than the rest of 
firms (see Levin et al., 1985, Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, and Symeonidis, 1996 for complete 
surveys of this empirical literature ). 
Our research in this paper introduces several distinct features in relation to previous 
works. First, we measure innovation activity in terms of outputs rather than in terms of inputs 
as it was done in the papers quoted above. We count as innovation the report by each firm in 
the sample that such activity has actually taken place. Therefore, not only patented innovations 
are considered. We believe that the report of product or process innovations is a more complete 
indicator of innovative activity than the use of the number of patents, since there are many 
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innovations that are introduced without being patented. Moreover, with these measures we 
proxy better the structural features that originate the adoption of innovations by an organization 
(Daft 1978, Moch and Morse 1977). 
Second, among the explanatory variables we include a measure of technological capital 
which, in fact, implies the estimation of an implicit "production function" of innovations. The 
stock of technological capital is constructed using a permanent inventory model of R&D 
'expenditures over time, with an exogenously given depreciation rate. So, our approach is in line 
with Hall and Mairesse (1993) or Crepon and Duguet (1997) and in contrast with Bound et al. 
(1984), Hall et al. (1986) or Garcia-Montalvo (1993) which use lagged R&D expenditures as 
inputs, without taking into account an explicit depreciation rate of capital. Since previous work 
with Spanish data has looked at inputs rather than outputs as indicators of innovation activity, 
there was no opportunity for estimating production functions. 
Third, we consider technological research as a heterogeneous activity that gives place 
to distinguish both, product and process innovations. In general, process innovation will be cost 
reduction driven, while product innovation is more likely to be oriented towards product 
differentiation. Then, one would expect that each type of innovation will be affected in a 
different way by the explanatory variables (Lunn 1986, Kraft 1990). Moreover, we can test 
whether each type of innovation is independent of the other or, to the contrary, they are jointly 
determined activities. Our study, however, departs from other evidence in two ways. First, 
because of the availability of panel data; second due to the definition of technological variable. 
Panel data allows us to use estimation methods that try to overcome possible biases derived 
from the omission of relevant unobserved firm specific variables among the explanatory 
factors. In that sense, we set up the possibility that the ability of managers influence the extent 
to which the innovation is adopted (Amabile 1983, Leonard-Barton and Deschamps, 1988). 
However, although the expectation firms tend to innovate more if manager behaviour is good, 
there exist some evidence that distinguish the different effects according to different types of 
2 
innovations (Zmud 1984). In terms of definition, we distinguish product from process 
innovations instead of using others measures (incremental versus radical, for instance, of Ettlie, 
Bridges and O'Keefe (1984) or Deward and Dutton (1986» because we focus on the output of 
innovation rather than the success of its adoption. 
Fourth, the data used is drawn from the Encuesta Sabre Estrategias Empresariales 
(ESEE) provided by the Spanish Industry and Energy Ministry for the period 1990-93. Hence, 
we can follow the same firms over time in each year of the period. This allows us to construct a 
balanced panel of data and to carry out an empirical exercise using a double estimation process. 
At a first stage, we estimate separately pooled Probits attending to the two types of innovation 
and assuming that both, innovation in process and innovation in product, are not related to each 
other. Second, we estimate random effects Probit models. In this case, we consider the 
existence of heterogeneous firm effects that could be related with the explanatory variables. 
Moreover, we test whether product innovations affect the probability to innovate in process and 
vice-versa. 
There are important implications arising from the empirical results of the paper. On the 
one hand, those related to the statistical procedures used to approach the problem. They 
confirm three issues: i) Product and process innovations are intimately related. ii) The control 
by unobserved managerial effects is so important as to affect the conclusions on the effects of 
almost all variables in the model. iii) Given the feedback effects amongst innovation decisions 
and other factors determining them, it is also very important to consider a version of the model 
that allows correlation among unobserved managerial effects and explanatory variables. 
Second, the results have several economic consequences: i) The probability to innovate is 
higher in capital intensive firms and in firms with export activities. ii) Market competition 
encourages innovation up to a threshold. iii) The past firm experience and the managerial 
quality play a significant role in the probability to innovate. iv) Product and process innovation 
decisions are complementary. 
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The paper contains 4 sections in addition to this introduction. The theoretical 
framework is presented in Section 2. Section 3 briefly describes the data used and presents the 
empirical specification and the measurement of the variables. Section 4 reports comparisons 
amongst the results obtained by the different econometric models, together with the tests of 
such models. Discussion of results jointly with some policy implications are reported in Section 
5, where we also provide a summary of the main conclusions. 
2. Theoretical framework 
The reduced equation model to be estimated explains the expected innovation decision 
as a function of the stock of technological capital at the beginning of the period, of the 
technological opportunities offered by the market and of other variables which refer to firm and 
market characteristics, 
[I] 
where I is an innovation count, G is the technological capital, r indicates technological 
opportunities and X is the rest of explanatory variables. 
Equation [1] can be derived as a result of a dynamic optimisation model in which firms 
decide on physical inputs, labour and capital and on innovation decisions, maximising its 
market value determined by the present value of future cash-flows; see Reinganum (1989) and 
Blundell et al. (1995) for further details. However, more theoretical analysis and explanation is 
needed to postulate which are the actual variables in X and how are they expected to determine 
the dependent variable. 
We expect that the technological capital Git-J will have a positive effect on the 
innovation activity, captured by lit, since the search effort which determines Git-J is intended 
precisely to be able to improve products and processes. In fact, equation [1] may be interpreted 
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as a production function of innovations where Git- l is a measure of the input, and 't, X it-l are 
proxies which influence the strategic decision to improve or not products/processes as the 
market and firm conditions evolve. 
Industries with more technological opportunities are expected to encourage innovation 
activity since the accumulated knowledge, mostly shared by many of the firms due to spillovers 
or other effects, reduces the cost of translating knowledge into new products and processes. But 
at the same time, it may work against innovation if the innovating firms consider that the 
innovation will be imitated by a rival in a short period of time. So, the net effect is uncertain. 
The variables to be included in X will be grouped into characteristics of the firm and 
characteristics of the market, as it is done in most of the previous literature. For a given stock of 
technological capital and opportunities, the size of the firm may influence the output of 
innovations due, for example, to differences in other physical, human and financial resources 
across firms with different size. In general, a positive effect of size on innovation output is 
expected, since larger firms tend to be less financially constrained. However, it may also 
happen that larger firms view themselves as less threatened by competition and lower the rate 
of innovation in order to not to erode profits of current products and processes. Besides, if the 
firm has monopoly profits the incremental profits of innovation will tend to be relatively lower 
than in a firm facing more competition. 
Previous empirical research has tested the effect of size on innovation activity (the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis) with mixed results but, in many of the cases, innovation activity 
was measured in terms of inputs rather than outputs. I The apparent disarray in obtaining 
consensus of the effect of firm size on innovation activity responds, in many cases, to the 
IPavitt et al. (1987) found that innovation intensity was greater for large firms and small firms, and 
smaller for medium-sized, in the UK industry. In contrast, Soete (1979) suggested that R&D intensity 
increased with size in a number of sectors in the US. Blundell et al. (1993) using the innovation counts 
found that higher market share firms innovate more, while firms in competitive industries tend to have a 
greater probability to innovate. 
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omlssIOn of many controls of firm and market characteristics despite the demonstrated 
importance of such effects (Scott, 1984). The size distribution of firms varies across industries, 
in part because of differences in the degree of scale economies in production and distribution. 
Thus, there is a good reason to believe that fixed industry effects are correlated with firm size 
and that the omission of such effects will bias estimates of the effects of size on innovation. 
Similarly, firm characteristics such as diversification and some measures of ~nancial capability 
are correlated with firm size. So, in order to isolate the size effect on innovation for a given 
knowledge stock is important to control for market competitive conditions and other firm 
features. 
The characteristics of the production technology may also affect the decision to 
introduce innovations for a given stock of technological capital; one variable used to 
differentiate production technologies is the intensity of physical capital. Firms with more 
capital intensive technologies will tend to innovate more if, as expected, the rents of innovation 
are less threatened as, to exploit the innovation, high investment in physical capital is required. 
It may also happen that more capital intensive processes provide less room for innovation since 
they are more automated and rigid. The final effect of capital intensity on innovation activity is 
uncertain. Kraft (1990) included only the capital intensity in the product equation obtaining a 
positive effect. 
Production processes may also be differentiated in terms of the degree of vertical 
integration. As firms internalise more activities there are more opportunities to innovate, all the 
rest equal, and probably there are more incentives to do it if the results of innovation can be 
spread over several activities. Although little quantitative work has been done in this area, some 
case studies suggest the presence of economies of scope to R&D in vertically related industries. 
Malerba (1985) studied the life cycle of technology in the semiconductor industry and found 
that the advantages of vertical integration for innovative activity had varied along the cycle. 
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Another variable, which has been related to innovation activity, is the price elasticity of 
demand faced by the firm. As Kamien and Schwartz (1970) showed, the gains from reducing 
the cost of production (process innovation) increase as the price elasticity of demand also 
increases, in absolute value; but for a given level of technological capital, the opportunities to 
innovate may be lower if the production process is highly standarised. On the other hand, firms 
with more homogeneous products (and therefore with many substitutes) may have more 
opportunities and incentives to try to introduce product innovations in order to differentiate the 
product and soften competition (Spence, 1975). 
Finally, the effect of competition on innovation activity could also have different signs, 
given a knowledge stock. The Schumpeter's proposition supports that firms in concentrated 
markets can more easily appropriate the returns from innovations while Arrow's hypothesis 
arguments that firm's gains from innovation are larger in a competitive industry than in a 
monopolistic one. This discussion suggests that there are many theoretical issues, which will 
have to be tested empirically' in order to know the sign of the net effect of the explanatory 
variable. The lack of a clear theory also reinforces the importance of using econometric 
estimation procedures that minimise estimation biases. Acs and Audretsch (1987) found that 
large firms are more innovative in concentrated industries with high barriers to entry, while 
smaller firms are more innovative in less concentrated industries that are less mature. Blundell 
et al. (1995) obtained innovation activity increases with market share and decrease with market 
concentration. Therefore, in the long run increase in market share may have a net negative on 
innovation if it also increases market concentration. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1.Data description 
The data set corresponds to the ESEE conducted over the period 1990-93 and surveying 
over approximately 2,000 firms every year. This is an unbalanced panel since some firms cease 
to provide information due to several reasons (mergers, changes to non-industrial activity or 
stop in production process). New companies enter the survey each year in an attempt to 
maintain representativeness. In particular, it constitutes a mixture data set where a random 
sample is drawn up for small companies (with less than 200 employees) while for large firms 
(greater than 200 employees) the sample is exhaustive. To offer a brief description of this 
survey we use two indicators: production activity and firm size. 
The production activity refers to industries whose firms belong to and the classification 
corresponds to the NACE-CLIO. Although this classification groups firms into 18 
manufacturing sectors, we have aggregated them to 5 for the purposes of the analysis. The size 
aggregation is constructed using the number of employees at December 31. It implies that 
temporary workers have been weighted by the period they have been hired by the firm. The 
ESEE survey uses specific size intervals: less than 20 workers, between 21 and 50, between 51 
and 100, between 101 and 200, between 201 and 500, more than 500. Both the industry 
classification and the size intervals are constructed keeping on the sample representativeness as 
we can observe in Table 1. 
8 
Table 1. Number of firms by size and industryl,2 
INNOVATING FIRMS 
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total 
< 20 workers 76 25 27 35 107 270 
21-50 78 27 14 34 134 287 
51-100 27 23 13 19 43 125 
101-200 39 18 19 17 45 138 
201-500 132 59 90 74 128 483 
>501 71 40 74 67 25 277 
Total 423 192 237 246 482 1580 
NON-INNOVATING FIRMS 
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total 
< 20 workers 217 52 63 137 345 814 
21-50 138 28 50 118 244 578 
51-100 45 20 11 35 67 178 
101-200 40 15 31 18 59 163 
201-500 110 48 53 73 112 396 
> 501 51 41 23 37 31 183 
Total 601 204 231 418 858 2312 
Notes. 
1. Innovating finns are those which engage product innovation, process innovation or both 
innovations at the same time. 
2. The 18 sectors ofNACE-CLIO classification have been aggregated to 5 in order to simplify the 
Table. 
This Table presents a cross tabulation of the sample using industry and firm size as 
determinants of innovation and distinguishing innovating from non-innovating firms. During 
this period, we have 40 per cent of firms undertaking some innovation activity (only in product, 
only in process and both product and process). This description allows us to assess that the 
most dynamic sectors within the innovative subsample are Chem and Leather. In general, large 
firms (more than 200 employees) innovate more although we observe an important role of the 
very small group in developing some technological advance. Almost in all innovator sectors, 
large firms carry out the R&D activities with the exception of the Leather industry, where 
companies with less than 50 workers have higher activity. 
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In Table 2, we present mean values for the two innovation activities according to 
industry classes and firm size (aggregating size intervals into firms with 200 or fewer workers 
and those with more than 200 workers). Moreover, we dissagregate those firms which only 
engage in one of these activities from those which do both simultaneously. In general, column 6 
(which reports aggregated figures) shows no differences in size when firms only innovate in 
product, while large firms present clearly higher figures when they only innovate in process. 
However, when we observe figures by sectors the behaviour is rather different. In terms of only 
product innovation, we do not observe a similar pattern attending to size and industries. For 
instance, small firms of Elec, Machin or Leather industries innovate in product, on average, 
almost double than large firms in the same industries. In contrast, large firms of Chem and 
Food develop more product innovations than small ones. In relation to firms only innovating in 
process, large firms innovate more in almost all industries with the exception of Electrical 
products. 
Table 2. Frequency ofInnovation Activityl 
Only Product Innovation 
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total 
small 0.077 0.183 0.114 0.056 0.110 0.099 
large 0.110 0.074 0.075 0.127 0.054 0.090 
Only Process Innovation 
small 0.153 0.135 0.088 0.121 0.116 0.125 
large 0.225 0.090 0.271 0.140 0.233 0.200 
Product and Process Innovation 
small 0.103 0.130 0.118 0.077 0.089 0.097 
large 0.223 0.362 0.337 0.295 0.230 0.278 
1. Figures are mean values for the frequency of innovation by size and sector. 
When companies carry out both process and product innovations simultaneously, large 
firms engage more R&D activities as regards the last row. In some cases, the relative frequency 
is three times larger than that corresponding to small firms (Le. figures corresponding to Elec or 
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Machin). This pattern suggests that depending on the type of innovation activity developed by 
the firm, the conclusions about the effects of the determinants can be very different, at least for 
some determinants at this very simple descriptive stage. 
3.2. Methodology 
The empirical model postulates a functional relation between innovation activity and 
some explanatory variables which in this paper are grouped into characteristics of the firms and 
characteristics of the markets in which the firm operates. 
As it has already been mentioned, innovation activity is measured in terms of output, 
and particularly in terms of a discrete variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has innovated 
in period t and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a distinction is made between innovations in product 
and innovations in process. Each type of innovation is expected to respond differently to the 
explanatory variables, and therefore there will be two empirical models to be estimated. 
Previous papers on this topic2 have pointed out that technological research and innovation can 
be directed towards product or process innovation, but not necessarily towards both. This, 
however, has been ignored most of the time in empirical work, where innovation has been 
considered as an homogeneous activity. 
Another important issue is whether there may be some interdependencies between 
process and product innovations, in the sense that when firms introduce a new product in the 
market, there will also be a need to improve the production process. The empirical model will 
allow for such possible interdependencies. 
Since our database contains information about the kind of innovation (product or 
process) that the firm engages on, we can separate the innovation output into these two types. 
The empirical treatment of the innovation indicator equation [1] could drive to the estimation of 
2See Link (1982), Scherer (1983), Link and Lunn (1984), Lunn (1986) or Kraft (1990). 
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two different specifications: one referred to product and another one referred to process 
innovation: 
where IPRODi/=l if IPRODj: > 0, and IPRODi/=O otherwise, in the first equation and 
IPROCi/=l if IPROCi: > 0, and IPROCi/=O otherwise, in the second equation. The error terms 
have the following structure Gtt=l1i+Uit and l'1t=J.li+Wit with Uit and Wit satisfying standard 
conditions. Moreover, the dependent variables are simple indicators (dummy variables) of 
whether or not a firm engages in product and/or process innovation. Moreover, we are 
interested in checking whether the development of process innovations affects the probability 
of innovating in product and vice-versa. Consequently, we estimate both equations introducing 
the alternative lagged innovation indicator (lPROCi/-1 in equation [2], IPRODi/_1 in equation 
[3]). 
Notice that innovation activity is conditioned on the technological capital stock of the 
firm GiI-1 • This implies that equations [2] and [3] can be interpreted as production functions of 
innovations, where XFIRM and XMARKET are explanatory variables of the innovation activity 
of the firm, for a given capital stock. Some of the firm and market characteristics included in 
XFIRM and XMARKET may also affect the capital stock Gi/_I , i.e., this stock is also 
endogenous. To account for this, GiI_1 will be instrumented by its prediction GINSTt_I .. We 
construct GINST regressing Git_1 on industry dummies, time dummies, firm characteristics, 
market characteristics and the past knowledge stock under the assumption that the error term is 
not autocorrelated. 
We are going to address the different questions posed in this paper in two steps. First, 
we implement individual discrete choice models for a general innovation indicator and for each 
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innovation decision. This allows us to check whether dissagregating different kinds of 
innovations matter. In this approach, we do not consider the possible influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, but we only estimate pooled probit models. In a second step, we try to overcome 
such problem, by estimating single probit models controlling for the presence of unobserved 
firm effects as managerial ability, experience, etc constant along the period. We also allow for 
the potential cross-effects of both innovation types.3 The procedure of those estimations are 
reported in Martinez-Ros (1998). 
3.3. Measurement of the variables 
The indicator variables follow the observability rules: IP ROD takes value 1 if firm 
carry out product innovations and zero otherwise and IP ROe takes value 1 if firm develop 
process innovations, and zero otherwise. 
The technological knowledge stock (G) captures previous R&D effort done by the firm 
affected by a depreciation rate. It is constructed as: 
[4] 
where Sit is the R&D expenditure of firm i in period t and 8 is the depreciation rate.4 This 
specification basically follows the reasoning of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) or Hall (1990) in 
the sense that all search contributes towards the innovation stock by generating a constant 
stream of incremental innovations. This search process story is called leaky bucket and implies 
that the decision about innovating (or the number of innovations obtained) evolves according to 
the indicator function [1] (or a count equation when I i( is observed).5 
3It is possible, for instance, to consider both the influences of the latent and observed product indicator on 
the decision to innovate in process and vice-versa. In the first case, the interpretation is that not only the 
output but also the probability matter while in the second, the assumption is that the information of 
previous periods is perfectly now in the current period. We allow for these two possibilities in the 
empirical analysis. 
4As in other studies, we use a depreciation rate equal to 30 per cent. We normalize by firm sales after 
obtaining G. 
5 Alternatively, we could assume that knowledge stock is obtained using number of patents or number of 
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Technological opportunity, T, reflects the influences of technological push in the 
industry (Lunn, 1986). We approximate it using the industry knowledge stock minus the own 
firm R&D expenditure (SPILL). It is constructed using [4] where S refers now to R&D 
expenditures at industry level and normalized by the industry sales net of firm sales. Notice that 
it captures an externality of R&D capital as Crepon and Duguet (1997) pointed out. The sign of 
the coefficient of this variable in the empirical model is ambiguous, since in an industry with 
high level of R&D activity there will also be more spillovers which may facilitate the 
innovation activity; but it may also happen that firms are in advantageous positions to imitate 
the innovations of other rivals in the industry and if this is the case, innovation activity may be 
showed. 
The XFIRM vector includes a list of characteristics of the firm which may influence the 
decision to innovate, for a given technological capital of the firm: size, production technology, 
vertical integration, export activity and foreign ownership. 
Size of the firm is measured by the In number of employees (LnEMP). In general, larger 
firms will have more complementary resources of the technological capital (financial, physical, 
commercial, ... ) and therefore, a positive effect of size in the probability of innovation is 
expected, both in product and in process. However, larger firms may be subject to more 
bureaucratic controls and dysfunction which may affect negatively their capacity to translate 
capital stock into innovations. Moreover, if size is positively associated with market power, the 
incremental benefits of innovation may be relatively lower for larger firms than for smaller 
ones (Pavitt et af. 1987) and, specifically, could influence more in product innovating firms 
than in process innovating firms. 
The production technology is proxied by the ratio of sales to fixed assets of the firm 
(KSA).6 A higher value of the ratio means that the production process is relatively more capital 
innovations as in Blundell et af. (1995). 
6It measures the replacement value of the fIrm's machinery capital stock following the traditional literature 
14 
intensive. More capital intensive process may make more difficult to improve current product 
and process, because the production process is less suitable for adjustments and manipulations 
than in more labour intensive technologies. On the other hand, the introduction of new 
production technologies gives the opportunity to change current products and processes and 
therefore to innovate. So, the actual relation between capital intensity of the production process 
and innovation activity may be considered an empirical issue. 
The degree of vertical integration of the firm will be measured, inversely, by the ratio 
of purchases to other firms divided by the total value of production, both variables defined in a 
yearly basis (CISP). As we indicated above, as the firm performs more activities internally, 
there are more opportunities to innovate and therefore a negative sign of the variable CISP is 
expected. 
A dummy variable (DEXP), which takes the value of 1 when the firm exports and 0 
otherwise, is used to describe the export activity of the firm. We expect that export activity 
favours innovation, as their presence in foreign markets may require more innovations in order 
to be competitive. But it is also true that firms with more innovation activity may have more 
incentives to export since they also have more intangible resources to sustain growth. So, no 
clear direction ofthe causality may be established. 
Finally, a dummy variable (CAPEXT) is used to indicate if the firm is controlled by 
foreign ownership (50 per cent or more). This is a control variable for which no clear sign can 
be expected from the theory. 
On the other hand, the XMARKET variables pick up industry shifters, which try to 
characterise the market structure.? We will refer first to the degree of competition in the product 
about the measurement of capital stock while constructing it (Blundell et al. 1992). 
7 A typical variable employed to measure the market structure is the concentration. Cohen and Levin 
(1989) offer a complete overview of the relationship between R&D and concentration and an extensive 
discussion about the ambiguous predictions obtained in empirical studies. 
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market proxied, inversely, by market concentration. In general, the empirical evidence supports 
Schumpeter's arguments that firms in concentrated markets can more easily appropriate the 
returns from inventive activity. Others works find evidence that market concentration do not 
promote R&D because the expected incremental innovating rents are larger in competitive 
markets than under monopoly conditions (Arrow, 1962, Bozeman and Link, 1983). The 
discussion about the right sign of this variable needs to be related to the endogeneity of the 
measure used in the empirical analysis, i.e. the concentration ratio. As Levin and Reiss (1984) 
and Levin et al. (1985) showed, the endogeneity of concentration produces biases in the 
estimates of the effect over innovation activity. To avoid the possible endogeneity bias of the 
concentration variable, the intensity of market competition will be approximated, in an inverse 
way, by the average gross profit market of the industry (AVGMBE). in order to capture, whether 
market competition encourages innovation activity. A positive sign would give support to 
Schumpeter's hypothesis while a negative sign would be in accordance with Arrow's 
predictions. The introduction of this variable in both innovation equations also allows us to test 
for different effects of market competition in product and process innovation (Lunn, 1986 and 
Kraft, 1990).8 We include the squared of gross profit market (A VGMBE2) in order to capture 
possible non-linearities in the market competition. 
Another characteristic of the market that may affect innovation activity is the growth of 
demand (Schmookler,1966). A dummy variable RECES is defined which takes the value of 1 
when the market of the firm is in a recession and 0 otherwise. The theory predicts that growth 
of demand encourages innovation and therefore a negative coefficient for RECES is expected. 
The homogeneity of product is captured by a dummy variable (EP) that takes the value 
of 1 when firm produces a standard product and 0 otherwise. This variable is proxying the 
elasticity of demand because standard products are viewed as homogeneous products and, 
8These authors separate process from product innovation and find opposite results. While in Lunn (1986), 
concentration is precisely estimated only in the process equation, Kraft (1990) fmds that concentration 
only affects to the product equation. 
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hence, a more elastic demand. The theory suggests that the production of product innovations 
needs to inelastic demands (Spence, 1975), while the production of process innovation 
enhances with elastic demands (Kamien and Schwartz, 1970). 
Finally, we control possible shocks common to all industries using time dummies. We 
also control time invariant firm effects in the models estimated using the panel nature of the 
data. The unobserved effects 11i and Ili would be recovering managerial quality, firm experience 
in doing R&D activities, ability in internal organisation, etc. in the production of innovations. 
We expect that higher quality in the management, higher probability to innovate. 
4. Findings 
We try to answer the questions posed in the previous sections of this paper using the 
estimation methods outlined above. It is important to notice that the interpretation of the 
obtained results will be different if we control for unobserved firm effects or not. These 
heterogeneous effects are considered random along the different specifications because of the 
number of firms involved in the exercise. It is reasonable to think that if these variables (for 
instance, managerial ability) are important in the decision to innovate, falling to control them 
would provide inconsistent parameter estimates. However, the pooled probit results of Table 3 
should still be consistent if firm specific effects do not matter. But this is not a plausible 
assumption in a model that determines innovation frequencies. In order to take account of this 
fact, we estimate random effects probit models whose results are reported in Table 4. 
Moreover, we test whether product and process innovations are independent of each other. 
We are interested in answering the following questions. First, we like to test whether 
estimating pooled discrete choice models on total innovations produces different results from 
those obtained considering each type of innovation separately. We use univariate probit models 
without controlling for heterogeneity to conduct these tests. Second, we would like to test the 
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simultaneity between both types of innovation.9 If managerial ability is correlated with physical 
capital stock, for example, we will get biassed estimates. Moreover, this is going to happen in 
the presence of feed-backs innovation decissions and explanatory variables. 
Our first concern is about the homogeneity between the models that explain product 
and process innovations. Table 3 presents the probit results of three empirical specifications, 
which allow us to test for such hypothesis. The second issue is about the simUltaneity between 
the two innovation activities. The results of Table 3 confirms such simultaneity where past 
process (product) innovation indicator affects the probability of current product (process) 
innovation. Finally, the last concern is about the relevance of the firm specific effects. 10 The 
results presented in Table 4 introduce firm specific effects in the probit estimation under the 
assumption that the effects are random and correlated with the other explanatory variables. The 
more general specification of the models with fixed effects justifies that we take the results of 
Table 4 as the relevant ones to test the theoretical predictions. However, it will also be 
econometrically and economically relevant to understand the discrepancies between the results 
presented in the different tables. 
In addition, to interpret the differences among the results in Tables 3 and 4 in terms of 
correlation among unobserved and observed variables, we must also bear in mind that the 
whithin groups procedure transforms the variables to differences within the firm. Therefore, as 
regards the pooled models, the within groups results indicate whether changes in variables at 
the firm level affect the innovation decisions. 
, 
9The statistics of the main variables (see Martinez-Ros, 1998) reveals that the two sets of firms are very 
similar. Two reasons seem to justify this behaviour. First, the data correspond to the same companies or, 
second, both activities seem to be complements more than substitutes. 
IOWe consider the lagged observed variable of the alternative equation affects the contemporary decision 
to innovate. The results of these models are valid under not correlated mixed error terms. We also need 
absence of correlation between the individual component of the product equation and the lagged process 
indicator and the individual component of the process equation and the lagged product indicator. These 
last assumptions are relaxed in the estimation of Table 4. 
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TABLE 3. PROBITS RESULTS (pOOLED DATAi,2 
I Dependent Variable: I INNOVA I IPROD IPROC 
Intercept -1.012 -1.574 -1.540 -1.260 -1.266 
(4.06) (5.88) (5.67) (4.94) (4.88) 
IPRODt_1 0.454 
(7.66) 
IPROCt_1 0.518 
(8.72) 
KSAt_1 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
(3.29) (2.85) (2.78) (2.28) (2.07) 
GINSTt_1 0.206 0.351 0.370 0.037 0.021 
(2.68) (4.01) (4.20) (0.41) (0.23) 
SPILLt_1 -0.012 0.008 0.007 -0.011 -0.010 
(0.32) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.26) 
DEXPt_1 0.461 0.513 0.482 0.264 0.202 
(7.75) (7.91) (7.33) (4.28) (3.22) 
AVGMBEt_1 0.050 0.061 0.060 0.036 0.033 
(1.45) (1.63) (1.58) (1.02) (0.94) 
AVGMBE2t_1 -0.256 -0.345 -0.335 -0.162 -0.141 
(1.81 ) (2.20) (2.11 ) (1.11) (0.96) 
InEMPt_1 0.141 0.106 0.069 0.192 0.179 
(6.83) (4.93) (3.13) (9.11) (8.39) 
EPt-1 0.006 0.236 0.275 -0.176 -0.200 
(0.12) (4.07) (4.68) (3.27) (3.69) 
RECES t_1 -0.092 -0.106 -0.114 -0.108 -0.105 
(1.67) (1.76) (1.88) (1.88) (1.82) 
CAPEXTt_1 -0.014 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.018 
(0.20) (0.22) (0.27) (0.31 ) (0.27) 
CISPt_1 -0.129 -0.151 -0.132 -0.145 -0.131 
(1.03) (1.20) (1.02) (1.14) (0.99) 
Notes. 
1. All estimations include time dummies. 
2. t-ratios in brackets 
Table 4 report results allowing for heteroscedasticity and correlated effects. Notice that 
those results are provided using the within-groups transformation (in order to rule out the 
effects) after obtaining reduced form predictions for the innovation decisions. Therefore, as a 
consequence of whithin groups transformation, all variables without time variation are also 
ruled out while estimating. On the other hand, the correlation amongst effects and variables is 
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confirmed while estimating the reduced form models. 11 
TABLE 4. PROBITS RESULTS 
(PANEL DATA) 1 
Dependent Variable: IPROD IPROC 
IPRODt_1 0.262 
(24.9) 
IPROCt_1 0.278 
(26.5) 
KSAt_1 0.005 0.003 
(6.76) (3.44) 
GINSTt_1 0.263 0.002 
(27.9) (0.18) 
SPILLt_1 0.011 -0.079 
(1.85) (14.5) 
DEXPt_1 0.174 0.108 
(9.27) (6.34) 
AVGMBEt_1 0.059 0.039 
(10.5) (7.61) 
AVGMBE2t_1 -0.306 -0.191 
(13.5) (9.27) 
InEMPt_1 0.041 0.185 
(2.07) (10.3) 
RECESt_1 -0.068 -0.074 
(6.46) (7.76) 
CAPEXTt_1 -0.031 -0.123 
(1.06) (4.63) 
CISPt_1 -0.193 -0.122 
(7.72) (5.40) 
Notes. 
1. t-ratios in brackets. 
2. Random effects probit model (correlation 
amongst effects and variables, i.e. two stage 
within-groups using Chamberlain's method). 
Heteroscedasticity allowed. 
We must look carefully at the results in Tables 3 and 4 for two reasons. First, results do 
not directly evaluate the effects on innovations of their main determinants. Second, 
IIWe observe that the coefficients (sign and significance) change when moving from a specification 
without firm specific effects to a specification considering them. 
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specifications [2] and [3] are the indicator counterparts of the production functions of 
innovations, conditional on a given level of technological stock. Consequently, the coefficients 
should also be interpreted conditional on these levels. Given the first reason above, we provide 
the marginal effects of each variable, ceteris paribus, in Table 5. 
TABLE 5. MARGINAL EFFECTS CONDITIONAL ON A GIVEN 
KNOWLEDGE STOCK1,2 
IPROD IPROC 
IPRODt_1 0.363 
IPROC t_1 0.273 
KSAt_1 0.002 0.001 
GINSTt_1 0.096 0.000 
SPILLt_1 0.003 -0.023 
DEXP t_1 0.063 0.029 
AVGMBE t_1 0.021 0.011 
AVGMBE2 t_1 -0.111 -0.052 
InEMPt_1 0.015 0.050 
RECES t_1 -0.025 -0.020 
CAPEXTt_1 -0.011 -0.034 
CISPt_1 -0.070 -0.033 
Notes 
1. Figures are calculated at sample means. 
2. The marginal effects are evaluated as the product of the density function at 
maximum likelihood estimators and the corresponding estimate. For dummy 
variables (IPROD, IPROC, DEXP, RECES and CAPEXT), we calculate 
probabilities at the two regimes and the marginal effect is the increase 
(decrease) of changing from regime 1 (innovate) to regime 0 (do not 
innovate. 
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5. Discussion and implications 
Given the comments on the preceding section, we can focus on the discussion of the 
main results reported in Table 4. In particular, we concentrate on whether we reject or fail to 
reject the hypotheses set up in the theoretical model. Moreover, we also compare these results 
with the alternative specifications (Table 3) in order to illustrate how the omission of the 
correlation amongst firm specific effects and other explanatory variables affects the estimated 
coefficients. The expected result that innovation cannot be seen as a homogeneous activity is 
clearly confirmed in Table 3. Both types of innovations are determined in a different way, for 
the case of Spanish manufacturing firms. For a given technological stock, we observe a major 
impact of export activity in the probability to innovate in product that in process. On the other 
hand, firm size affects much more the decision to innovate in process than in product. Whether 
there is a recession in the output market, both activities are affected negatively in a same 
magnitude. 
Finally, Table 3 allows us to estimate the coefficient of EP, a variable for which we 
have only information available for 1990. The empirical evidence indicates that firms 
producing and selling standarised products (EP=I), have a higher probability to innovate in 
product and a lower probability to innovate in process. Product innovation gives the 
opportunity to differentiate the product and increase profits, and this increase will probably be 
relatively higher for firms which have a more standarised product to begin with. The negative 
coefficient of EP in the process innovation equation is more difficult to interpret since one 
would expect that cost reducing process innovations increase relatively more profits when the 
product is not differentiated and therefore the price elasticity of demand is higher in absolute 
terms (Kamien and Schwartz, 1970). 
The second hypothesis that firm specific effects do not matter, is rejected. We confirm 
this result when comparing the coefficients in Tables 3 and 4. These comparisons should be 
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done amongst the estimates in columns 3 and 5 of Table 3 with respect to those in Table 4. The 
control of managerial ability and experience in developing innovation activity really affect the 
influences of explanatory variables on the decisions to innovate, except for firm size and 
demand growth. Once taking account managerial ability, the experience repercussion on 
innovation reduces considerably. Moreover, we continue observing innovation as a 
heterogeneous activity. 
Within Table 4, the empirical evidence is in favour of the hypothesis of correlation 
between firm specific effects and other explanatory variables. Blundell et al (1995) also found 
evidence of such correlation. This correlation is different along the determinants of both 
innovation types. While we observe positive correlation among managerial ability and regressor 
related to external markets (DEXP and CAPEXT), this pattern, however, is not maintained with 
the others determinants. We could justify this behaviour since in exporting firms and in those 
with high foreign capital participation rates the managerial ability is more disciplined by the 
market. On the other hand, the effect of these variables are different on the two decisions. We 
observe a larger (lower) impact of export activity (foreign ownership) in product innovation. 
Allowing for firm effects correlated with KSA, more capital intensive firms have higher 
innovation activity. This means that the ability of the manager affects inversely the probability 
to innovate likely because those firms are more rigid and hierarchical. 
As expected, higher vertical integration is associated with higher innovation activity, 
both in product and in process innovations (the coefficient of CISP, purchases over production, 
is negative). However, while the ability of the manager is positively correlated with firms 
which are low vertical integrated in the decision of doing product innovation activity, it is 
negatively correlated with the decision of engaging process innovation activity. Firms with 
higher vertical integration need a bigger effort of board equipment in doing process 
innovations. 
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Among the explanatory variables which capture industry-market effects, we observe a 
negative coefficient of the industry R&D activity, SPILL, on process innovation. This result 
contrasts with the evidence often detected of a positive relationship between firm and industry 
R&D expenditures, positive association which has been interpreted as a positive effect of 
technological opportunities on R&D activity. The negative coefficient of SPILL in the probit 
estimation would be interpreted in terms of negative incentives to innovate, for a given stock of 
technological capital, due to the increasing facilities to imitate the innovation as the 
technological opportunities of the market (more intensity of R&D) also increases. This 
interpretation would also be consistent with the evidence that the absolute value of the 
coefficient of SPILL is larger in process innovations than in product innovations. 
We observe that the behaviour of market competition on the decisions to innovate is not 
monotonic. There exists a threshold of competition (which is estimated to be significantly equal 
to the mean of A VGMBE) that determines the degree of influence. With high competition, the 
probability to innovate grows because in the output market there exists opportunities of success 
in developing innovations, but when market competition achieves the threshold, we observe 
that the probability to innovate decreases. Again, we detect correlation between managerial 
ability and market competition. These results compare with Blundell et al. (1995) that found a 
positive effect of competition on innovation activity and Kraft (1990) that reports an effect of 
market structure on product innovation but not in process innovation. 
The effect of size on innovation is always higher for process innovations indicating that 
large firms have more facilities (internal capabilities, resources) to innovate in process than in 
product. So, for a given stock of technological capital, size increases are always associated with 
increases in innovation activities, confirming that larger firms are in a better situation than 
smaller ones when translating R&D effort into process innovations. This result contrast with 
the empirical evidence often found on a "U inverted" relationship.12 On the other hand, firms in 
12See Pavitt et al. (1987). 
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recessive product markets innovate less than firms in markets where demand grows or is stable. 
This evidence is consistent with Schmookler's thesis that innovation is demand-push. 
Finally, we are also interested in testing the complementarity (in probability) between 
innovation measures. We have introduced, as explained in the empirical analysis, 
predetermined alternative innovation indicator variables in order to test this hypothesis. Process 
innovation has an important role in the probability to innovate in product as well as product 
innovation has it in the innovation in process, and the size of those effects are reduced when we 
have into account the unobserved firm effects. One could consider that the experience in doing 
innovation as a specific firm effect is positively correlated with the production of innovations in 
the past. In particular, it is possible that the production of new product inventions could be 
more affected by the experience than the development of production processes. It would be 
coherent with Kraft's results, although both the measurement of technical variables and the 
estimation methods are different. However, Kraft only finds evidence in one direction, i.e. he 
only shows a positive impact of product-innovation on process-innovation. We provide 
evidence for the reverse effect: process innovation has positive effect on product innovation 
which is in line with the simultaneity of both activities. 
As a conclusion of this paper we summarise in Table 5, the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the probability to innovate in product and process, conditional on a 
given level of a knowledge stock. A change of regime from non-innovating to innovating in 
process in the last year increases the probability of innovating in product by 27.3 per cent. The 
experience in product innovations encourages the process innovation probability in 36.3 per 
cent. Therefore, capital intensive firms and exporters produce major product innovations, given 
a knowledge stock but large firms produce major process innovations. A 1 per cent increment 
in employment level produces only an increment of 1.5 per cent in the probability to innovate in 
product while a 5.2 per cent in the probability to innovate in process. The effect of competition 
degree is double in firms doing product innovation with respect those carrying out process 
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innovations., indicating that increases in competition affects more to the production of new 
products by the threat of imitation On the other hand, the technological opportunity has a 
negative influence only on process innovation. A demand recession reduces the probability to 
innovate in similar magnitude to both innovation activities. Finally, we confirm Malerba's 
hypothesis that higher vertical production control implies higher probability to innovate. 
Approximately, one per cent change in vertical integration increases 7 per cent the probability 
to innovate in product and 3 per cent that corresponding to process. 
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